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Abstract: It is fundamental in both a theoretical and practical sense, to analyse the strategies of successful e-businesses who 
were formulated and operated alongside incumbent competitors. Thus, there have been an array of strategic arguments 
concerning the rapidly-burgeoning virtual powerhouse Alibaba, who amidst a sea of fortified competitors, found their ground 
to become one of the most prominent e-businesses of the decade. At the commencing stages, Alibaba lacked a specific 
strategic goal, aside from the ethnic-originated ecology scheme. Further mishaps arose even after the take-off stage, when 
Alibaba opted to adhere to the diversification strategy, an evidently unusual phase for a virtual firm. Hence, it is the subject of 
common debate as to whether Alibaba cited a definitive strategic goal which guided their progress, or whether they were 
merely the product of a breakneck growth in the Chinese economy. This research will show how a leading e-Commerce 
company Alibaba has built B2B/C2C business portal Taobao/TMall and has transformed its transaction system from zhifubao 
into yuerbao and how it propelled Alipay to become a leading financial institution in the thriving digital market. In addition, 
strategic diversification on Chinese digital business will be examined through Alibaba case. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1999, there were 18 gold-diggers whom ransacked the 
World Wide Web, in search of a new innovation that would 
shape the face of e-commerce. Based in a small apartment in 
the city of Hangzhou, led by a man of great persistence, Jack 
(Chinese name Yun) Ma; who had previously failed two 
university entrance exams, known as Gao Kao, in his 
homeland China, was eventually admitted into a under-
performing university in Hangzhou. Since 1999, the 
company has walked hand in hand with the Chinese 
development phases, and will soon cement themselves as 
being one of the most successful IT derived industries to 
come into existence, in terms of their IPO rate and their 
market share. This is Alibaba, the first e-commerce company 
that formulated transactions that exceeded the value of $1 
trillion a year in 2012. (The Economist 23rd Match 2013) 
Since Alibaba as a firm is still in its infancy, it is dubious 
to acknowledge the nature of it via the use of a strategic 
theory, as traditional strategic theories are incompatible with 
the concept of e-commerce. As a result, the notion of the 
ecology concept, derived from James Moore’s article of 
‘Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition,’ (1993) 
is the most coherent and akin to the development procedure 
undertaken in the firm’s Jack year history. Thus, Moore’s 
theory of ‘A New Ecology of Competition,’ within e-
business will be utilised to comprehend the nature of 
Alibaba’s strategical advancement until 2013, and her stance 
within the realm of e-commerce. Since 2013, Alibaba has 
adhered to the traditional diversification strategy, 
acknowledged by the ‘Born Global Firm’ initiative, as the 
basis for their ongoing globalization scheme.  
In an era of greater interconnectedness in the digital world, 
B2B and B2C firms are commonly defined as being 
“business organisations that from inception, seek to derive 
significant competitive advantages from the use of resources 
and for the sake of output in multiple countries” (Oviatt & 
McDougall, 1994). However, unalike the typical global firm, 
Alibaba has opted to synchronize their resources; in a bid to 
reap greater benefits from the sino-ethnics across the world 
who form the basis of Alibaba’s initiative.  
According to Johanson and Vahlne (1997), the incremental 
and sequential learning that is derived from the Uppsala 
model is often considered to serve as the foundation for the 
‘born global firms.’ However, several researchers exhibited 
the fact that new global born firms are able to internationalise 
with ease, without adhering to the Uppsala gradualist 
approach (Rialp, Rialp, Urbano and Vilant, 2005). An 
exemplar of this in recent years, has been Alibaba.  
The notion of a Business Ecosystem, which was initially 
formulated by Moore, states that companies co-evolve 
capabilities around a new innovation; they work cooperatively 
and competitively to support new products, satisfy customer 
needs, and eventually incorporate the next round of 
innovations. He further divided the evolution of a business 
ecosystem into four distinct, individual facets: birth, 
expansion, leadership, and self-renewal. Thus, concluding that 
companies are viewed not as a member of a single industry but 
as part of a business ecosystem that interlinks across a plethora 
of industries. A business ecosystem, alike to its biological 
counterpart gradually moves from the notion of a chaos to a 
cosmos, thus resulting in a more structured community. 
Based on Moore’s theorem of a business ecosystem, there 
are in-turn four evolutionary stages that a firm goes through 
prior to burgeoning into a competent business ecosystem. To 
begin with, during its birth; the cooperative challenges that 
the firm encounters is working with customers and suppliers 
to define the new value proposition around a seed innovation. 
In addition, the competitive challenges it may face are 
protecting their ideas from others who might be working 
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towards defining similar offers, and tying up critical lead 
customers, key suppliers and important channels. Next, once 
a firm gets to its expansion stages, one must bring the new 
offer to a larger market by working with suppliers and 
partners to scale up supply and to achieve maximum market 
coverage. However, it must also defeat alternate 
implementations of similar ideas, and ensure that their 
approach is the market standard in its class through 
dominating key market segments. Then, in its penultimate 
stage which concentrates on the matter of leadership, they 
must provide a compelling vision for the future that 
encourages suppliers and customers to work as a singular 
unit to continue to improve on the complete offer. One must 
also maintain a strong bargaining power in relation to other 
players in the ecosystem, including key customers and valued 
suppliers. Finally, on the concluding stage of self-renewal, 
the cooperative challenges that may arise, involve working 
with innovators to bring new ideas to the existing ecosystem. 
Furthermore, the competitive challenges it may encounter, 
involve maintaining high barriers to entry to prevent 
innovators from building alternative ecosystems. They must 
also maintain high customer switching costs in order to buy 
time to incorporate new ideas into their own products and 
services, a feat which Alibaba, yearns to follow. 
2. Birth (from 1995 to 2003) 
To begin with, in the year 1995, with the invention of the 
World Wide Web, a new paradigm of e-business opened up 
for Mr. Ma, which allowed him to acknowledge a loophole 
by which he was able to idealise and revolutionise e-
commerce in China. This caused him to initiate a small e-
commerce business, which went by the name of 
‘ChinaPages.com’, which provided website development and 
indexing services to local entrepreneurs. However, due to the 
differences in strategic vision, Ma and eight members of the 
core development team eventually left the organisation in 
favour of a new idea.  
This eventually led to the formation of ‘Alibaba.com’, 
which was essentially analogous to the previous 
ChinaPages.com. As a result, we can acknowledge that there 
was a deprivation of strategic innovation, which 
differentiated them from subsequent firms.  
In the commencing stages, in 1999, Ma and his crew had 
an initial budget of 500,000 RMB, 200,000 of which was 
derived from Jack Ma’s pocket. 
In July 2000, the company was featured by Forbes, as its 
cover story as a leading B2B firm, and it was again singled 
out in 2001, as being one of the ‘Best of the Web.’ Ma, 
himself, was further lauded as being one of the 100 Global 
leaders for tomorrow by the World Economic Forum. 
However, at that time, Alibaba.com solely derived its 
revenue from online advertising, and had been operating in 
the red before 2001, when they eventually recorded their first 
ever profit on a cash-flow basis. Thus, one can conclude that 
Alibaba’s role as the ‘middle man,’ was neither elaborate nor 
grandiose as it portrayed. As they solely created a platform to 
which sellers would upload their products, businesses would 
upload their requirements, and supplier-buyer matches would 
be made, there was no unique methodology that was eligible 
in generating a profit. 
On the contrary, as a result of the ‘dot com’ burst, external 
manufacturing firms, especially in America, sought after 
cheap goods. Thus, they averted to utilise Alibaba, which 
enabled them to gradually increase their market share, as a 
result of the avid desire of foreign firms. All in all, one can 
acknowledge that it was predominantly due to the external 
factors, alike to the dot com burst, that stimulated the 
advance of Alibaba, not the success of a distinct strategic 
objective, as perceived by many. In addition, owing to 
China’s entrance into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, 
mediocre firms opened their doors to American suitors, for 
which Alibaba served as the gateway. This was demonstrated 
in Ma’s interview with Ignatius, when he stated that, ‘There 
were three reasons why we survived. We had no money, we 
had no technology, and had no plan.’ 
According to Allen and Phillips, family ownership brings 
forth an assortment of problems when obtaining resources, 
whereas corporate ownership provides small and medium 
enterprises with an easier access to financial, technological or 
commercial resources and capabilities (2000). As a rather 
family orientated business, (although Alibaba was initially 
made up of 18 individuals, it was nonetheless, perceived as 
being Jack Ma’s private venture) Alibaba attempted to solve 
their financial conundrum via benefiting from the owner’s 
personal ties, rather than through corporate strategy. This 
lasted until 2014, when Alibaba was listed on the US stock 
market. Thus, Ma’s statement in his interview with the 
Business Week, that Alibaba had neither money nor strategy 
was indeed correct.  
Alibaba itself remained in the ‘wilderness’ not only 
strategically but financially, until May 2003, whereby they 
introduced the online shopping website ‘Taobao’, which 
averted them towards success.  
3. Expansion (Between 2003 & 2008) 
To begin with, during the course of the last two years, 87% 
of Alibaba’s clients globally, were concerned about the 
notion of trust regarding the nature of their goods, and thus, 
Ma utilised this as the loophole to obtain capital. As a result, 
the new strategy that was known as the ‘Trust Passed 
Scheme,’ involved the firms paying a deposit of 2300 RMB, 
which guaranteed their status as trustworthy firm. Owing to 
this, by the end of the 2002 spell, Alibaba reaped 6 million 
RMB in profits. 
In May 2003, the notion of a ‘free’ platform where one 
could trade merchandise, liberated from fees and commissions, 
was born; which was a by-product from his trip to America. 
This was known as ‘Taobao’. Soon after its formation, it 
gradually began to strengthen in caliber, and soon displaced 
eBay China, as the key player in the fledging market of e-
commerce. It is stated that Taobao hold a colossal 60% market 
share with 1.1 trillion yuan (US$178 billion) in their respective 
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field. They achieved this via the generic Chinese methodology, 
whereby they prioritise the voice of the audience; who has 
purchased the product afore, when deciding whether or not 
they would buy it for themselves.  
The most influential virtual businesses today tend to be 
those that intertwine distinct groups of entities in a business 
network to form a cohesive unit. The prevalence of inter-
network, as opposed to inter-firm competition, further 
galvanizes a firm’s ability to thrive. (Pierce, 2009). What is 
commonly referred to as the sponsors of multi-sided 
platforms (hereafter MSPs), these businesses provide the 
infrastructures, services and rules that enable transactions 
between network members (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). A MSP 
is a commercial network, linking suppliers, producers, 
intermediaries, customers, and producers of complementary 
products and services (commonly known as 
‘complementors’) (Teece, 2007). They are held together by a 
formal contract and mutual dependency (Pierce, 2009).  
Cross-side network effects must exist between the different 
groups of entities on a MSP, as they are unable to establish 
themselves independently. Hence, MSPs, have to build on the 
notion of an two-sided market with varying forms of 
economic behavior that arise from the dichotomy between 
the buyers and sellers. (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). Furthermore, 
both sides of the MSPs are managed by a sponsor that is 
liable for providing the required infrastructure and the 
relevant services that are required to stimulate interactions 
and triangular exchanges between the different groups of 
entities. They are further required in establishing the rules 
that govern each individual transaction and to enable the 
coordination of network activities to take place with ease 
(Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). However, a key point of 
difference is that, unlike these two-sided markets, MSPs are 
more intricate in that they serve a variety of distinct entities 
with diverse interests. 
The ethnic originated MSPs for both entities are unique 
facets of Taobao, such as its concentration on the sino-ethnic 
market, which led to its eventual growth. Akin to the notion 
of a Chinese takeaway, which are present all over the globe; 
Taobao enrolled the service of sino-ethnics around the world, 
as a supplier of multi-national products. This permitted them 
to minimise the service costs, and thus they were able to 
supply a copious array of products at a diminished price. 
Next, the fact that the service of sino-ethnics were utilised 
resulted in the value of foreign traders being minimalised; as 
96% of Taobao merchants were of Chinese origin according 
to an anonymous source close to the company. 
Contrary to popular belief that Taobao has the capacity to 
burgeon into a global firm, it is in essence, a Chinese firm for 
the Chinese people, due to its dominance by sino-ethnics 
around the world, which diminishes the need of foreign 
investors. Furthermore, the site itself is displayed in solely 
Chinese, which cements the fact that it prioritises the Chinese 
market above all. “There were three strategic factors that 
differentiated us from our foreign competitorsones’. First, we 
provided tools like ‘Wangwang’ (which allowed transacting 
parties to haggle over prices), and Alipay (which helped 
mitigate the greater mistrust of online transactions among 
Chinese firms), Second, we provided our service free of 
charge. Third, our website were designed to suit to our 
Chinese culture’ (Company website, 2014). These unique 
strategies were however, unable to benefit the foreign 
sellers/buyers who had no intricate knowledge of the Chinese 
culture or language. Thus, this exemplified the fact that 
Alibaba was, as still is aimed at Chinese users, rather than the 
foreign market.  
Next, the ‘free,’ nature of it; resulted in multiple merchants 
and customers alike flocking to shift their goods to the global 
audience. As it was the idyllic manner in which small 
businesses could generate a substantial profit without being 
suppressed by taxes. Furthermore, unalike its competitors such 
as ‘Amazon.com.cn’, Taobao prioritised small sized 
businesses, which enabled it to rapidly escalate its market 
share.  
On the contrary, although Taobao itself is officially a free 
service; as demonstrated by the ‘Trust-Passed-Scheme, in 
order for business to flow with ease, one needs to deploy 
funds for their respective businesses’ to be of a higher calibre 
than that of their competitors. Thus, one can perceive that in 
essence, if one desires to generate a profit; the usage of funds 
is imminent. 
Furthermore, the key factor which enabled to Alibaba, and 
Taobao to burgeon into a major player in the market was due 
to the ‘Trust-Passed Scheme,’ which was implemented in 
March 2002. This scheme dissolved the notion of mistrust 
among the buyers, as it cemented the statuses’ of sellers as 
being both reliable and trustworthy.  
The ‘Trust-Passed Scheme,’ in essence, was an internet 
marketing strategy, which was offered to members to give 
them priority and ‘kudos,’ among their competitors. Next, it 
enabled their items to be displayed afore that of others, thus 
giving them precedence. This was inevitably favorable as it 
entails in a greater quantity of sales. This is as, on a platform 
that processes 40 million visits per day, with 4.87 million 
registered users, priority is a vital element. Furthermore, post 
the initiation of this scheme; subscribers can gain access to 
‘Aliwang wang’, an instant messenger platform that permits 
the buyer and seller to communicate instantly with greater 
ease. This essentially results in the production of a ‘virtual 
community,’ whereby the buyers and sellers are harmonious 
with one another and it further enables links to be established. 
It was natural to consider the notion of the asymmetrical power 
relationship between the buyer and seller, owing to the 
information problems regarding the product, whereby the 
seller knows a greater deal regarding the quality and calibre of 
the products. Hence, the payment initiative for buyers and the 
concept of holding the payment; until confirmation was given 
by the buyer, were accepted with great ease by Chinese C2C 
businesses, a scheme which Alipay invented. This was eligible 
to be carried out as Alibaba was at its birth, a trading directory, 
which interlinked buyers from around the world to suppliers in 
China (B2B business). Therefore, due to the nature of this 
scheme, they were able to reap suppliers of a higher quality to 
vendor their products in America, and through the passing of 
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the scheme to Taobao, they provided the blueprints for a 
Chinese originated transnational C2C business. 
As mentioned afore, China joined the WTO in December 
2001, and simultaneously the US Department of Commerce 
announced the fact that Alibaba was the most reliable online e-
commerce site in China. As a result, there are around 800 
foreign manufacturing corporations who solely rely upon 
Alibaba to supply them with the relevant materials from China. 
Also, as a guarantee to this scheme, Alibaba enlisted the 
aid of three external Chinese firms, Hua Xia, ShangHai Jie 
Sheng and Ao Mei Zixun, as official guarantees, which 
essentially validated Alibaba as a whole, as a trustworthy and 
credible firm. This ultimately served as the foundation to the 
‘trust scheme.’ 
4. Leadership 
In the concurrent Chinese society, Jack Ma is perceived as 
being akin to the late Steve Jobs. Whereas Jobs 
revolutionised the hardware industry, Ma stormed the 
software market, and refashioned the industry in the face of 
his ideology.  
However, contrary to popular belief, Ma is quite the 
opposite of this façade. Prior to the escalation of Alibaba, Ma 
sought the aid of Mr Masayoshi Son, the head of Softbank in 
Japan, whom he met on dual occasions. In the year 1999, 
February, during the course of the ASEAN Electronic 
Business meeting in Singapore, Ma’s eyes opened up to the 
copious possibilities that the internet could bring about. Thus, 
in January 2000, Mr Son initiated a meeting of various 
Chinese IT leaders, whereby he gave them 20 minutes to 
capture his gaze. However, Ma did not attend on the basis 
that he was not after the funding, but he desired the 
innovative flare that Son possessed, to utilise as the catalyst 
to enhance Alibaba. Instead, in subsequent months he flew to 
Japan, and the 6 minute meeting which resulted in a financial 
injection of 20 million dollars in exchange for 30% of shares, 
kick-started the incline of Alibaba’s reign. This investment, 
derived from Son’s personal fortune, gave Ma the dogma, 
and the capital, to augment Alibaba’s prestige. A further 82 
million dollars, which was provided by Son’s consortium 
enabled Alibaba to develop into a multifunctional 
conglomerate, with the introduction of Aliwang wang, an 
instant messaging platform for the buyer and sellers to 
converse, as well as Alipay, the online payment system.  
In addition, the meeting illustrated the value of strategic 
diversification to Ma, and further exhibited the need for a 
multi-dimensional business frame. Akin to Mr. Son, who was 
at the helm of a multi-model business, ranging from internet 
services to the banking sector, Ma started to diversify 
Alibaba; from a virtual business platform, to a unified virtual 
business gateway that supplemented everything from finance 
to social networking.  
Further to this, in comparison to Huateng ‘Pony’ Ma, who 
founded ‘Tencent’, Ma did not utilise a distinct strategic 
scheme, but instead opted to ‘hither and thither.’ Pony Ma’s 
prioritisation of social networking resulted in Tencent’s QQ 
becoming the world’s largest social networking platform. On 
the contrary, for Jack Ma, the subsequent external factors 
such as China joining the WTO enabled him to develop 
Alibaba into a key player in its respective field.  
In order for a business to develop into a preeminent firm in 
Chinese society, one needs to walk hand in hand with those 
in the political phase. Thus, Ma developed ties with Alvin 
Jiang (Jian Zhi Cheng), the grandson of the former Premier 
Jiang Zemin, who he came face-to-face with in 2012, whose 
private equity firm, Boyu launched a joint consortium led by 
China Investment Corp (CIC) to raise the sufficient funds for 
Alibaba to buy back half of Yahoo! Inc’s 40% stake. 
However, due to the departure of several high profile 
individuals in CIC, it eventually resulted in Boyu leading the 
negotiations, and with Alvin on Sean Tong’s team, he 
became directly involved in the negotiations.  
This is a typical exemplar of the traditional Chinese way, 
which cannot be defined as being a form of strategic 
evolution. Alibaba’s core is derived from traditional Chinese 
values; leaving minimal scope for Western consumers. Since 
its IPO in 2014, the majority of Western investors yearned for 
a strategic collaboration with Alibaba, but was impeded by 
the Chinese culture which instilled a mindset in Alibaba that 
ostracized any Western form of influence.  
5. Self-renewal (Since 2008) 
Taobao fundamentally consists of three prominent strategic 
factors; selling new products without the need of a ‘middle 
man or agents’, and hence there are strong benefits that are 
reaped from royalty consumers' 'gluttony' due to the fact that 
it is around 25% cheaper than brick and mortar shops. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric issue regarding the nature of 
the sellers’ priority has rapidly diminished with the 
introduction of Taobao wangwang, which permits online 
merchants to communicate directly with the consumers in 
real time. Furthermore, Taobao's seller-credibility rating 
system; which was a by-product of the 'Trust passed scheme’, 
which allows buyers to rate and post feedback about the 
vendors, creates a high level of trust regarding the products 
sold, through the ‘word of mouth’, and it makes the whole 
shopping experience more appealing and trustworthy, which 
enables Taobao to differentiate itself from subsequent firms 
in the virtual C2C market. Last but not least, Taobao 
members evaluate the credit of trading after finishing each 
transaction through Alipay. There are three ratings on the 
comments segment; ‘positive’, ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’. If the 
vendor was given a ‘positive’ rating, then the trader will get 
one score, ‘neutral’ will account for zero and a ‘negative’ 
rating will equate to the trader losing a score, and all scores 
are displayed beside the Taobao account holders' name 
(normally nickname). This scoring scheme will be a vital 
aspect of concern on the traders’ part as well as the buyers, as 
it drives traders to keep a clean and reliable track record 
which will inevitably bring them a greater amount of 
customers; this concept can be defined as 'insatiable' royalty. 
In April 2008, a dedicated platform for third-party brands 
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and retailers was introduced to complement Taobao, and was 
known as Taobao Mall, or Tmall, and it was essentially a 
strategic alteration from Taobao’s resources to Tmall with 
three different levels of customer standards based on the 
caliber of their deposits, such as ‘Basic Customers with 1688 
yuan’, ‘Standard Customers with 3688 yuan’ and ‘Limited 
Edition with 2800 yuan. The 'Basic’ and the ‘Limited’ services 
were however, terminated on December 2012 and a unified 
Standard Customer service was launched in its place. Tmall 
was based on a traditional shopping mall service scheme, with 
different product categories offered on alternate virtual 
windows. Furthermore, features such as storewide sales, and 
an accumulation of loyalty points in exchange for royalties are 
utilised to replicate the traditional shopping experience.  
A plethora of Western branded products have set up official 
stores on Tmall, and are in the stages of promoting and 
supplying foreign merchandise to middle class consumers in 
Mainland China. There are now around 50,000 stores and 
70,000 brands which accounts for a 50% share in the B2C 
market with an average revenue of US$ 300 billion in April 
2014. Within the first year, Tmall's total turnover from sales 
was in the region of 50 million yuan in 2009, which escalated 
to 936 million yuan in 2010, 3.36 billion yuan in 2011, and 
then proceeded to make history in the e-business market, as 
they broke the record of processing more than 100 million 
yuan's worth of transactions, in the first minute after the sales 
started on 11 November 2013, which was known as the 
notorious ‘Singles Day’. (CCTV report 11 Nov. 2013)  
Another impressive and highly commendable strategic 
diversification on Alibaba's part, was the upgrade of the 
Taobao/Tmall payment system, which was known as Alipay. 
It was a coherent and cogent online payment system that 
relied on escrow; the legal money transaction system that 
interlinked into personal wealth management; which 
eventually became known as Yuebao in 2013. Furthermore, 
the introduction of yuerbao (saving accounts), cemented 
Alipay as being a major competitor in the commercial 
financial institution. In addition, Alipay or initially zhifubao 
(current account), which was alike to the concept of paypal on 
e-Bay; in terms of the West, was essentially a tool for 
transaction for the B2C/C2C business. In 2013, the 
introduction of the yuerbao (saving account) caused an 
earthquake in the street banking service in China, and provided 
new digital business opportunities for global e-commerce, as it 
opened a plethora of doors, for the advancement of the e-
commerce market. Further to this, there were new tools of 
financial technology for yuerbao to utilise, which was also 
included in the visualised daily savings ratio, which made it 
eligible to transact from the banking account into the Alipay 
account with greater ease, and the Smart app allows immediate 
business transactions to take place whilst you are on the move. 
In addition, there is no additional charge when transferring 
funds from one account to another, which promotes those to 
spend more due to the absence of commission. In addition, 
although the traditional B2C/C2C is usually logged through 
the internet, Alibaba can be utilised through the use of Smart 
phones through its app and one can use this app when 
shopping online. In terms of its banking credit security, Alipay 
allows its users to check one’s banking information wherever, 
whenever you enter their security code, which is given post the 
conclusion of the transaction. Thus, due to this mobility, it 
provides a greater level of security than that of local banks, and 
one can transfer money with greater ease.  
In simpler terms, one can classify Alipay as being a 
current account, while Yuebao serves as a savings account 
with a higher interest ratio than local banks based on daily 
interest rates. In comparison to the traditional local banking 
service in China, Yuebao showed a technological 
development whereby the account holder is eligible to take 
the principal and interest away, whereby they are eligible to 
save, and debit their money with ease on any given day; and 
the previously obtained interest will not be affected. In 
addition, Yuebao offers a much higher annualised yield for 
investors; the interest rate was in excess of 6% during the 
first year and then went through a gradual decline to around 
4% in 2014.  
The Yuebao impact created a bigger ripple than expected 
as exemplified by Ma’s warning, which was described as ‘if 
banks do not change anything, then we change banks’ which 
became a reality in the traditional banking sectors in China. 
However, it did not have the same impact in the realm of 
virtual business. In 26 January 2014, when ‘Wechat’, China’s 
popular mobile social-networking application launched 
‘Hongbao (Red Envelop)’ on the day of the Chinese New 
Year, Jack Ma’s nightmare started. Initially, Alibaba invented 
the ‘red envelop’ scheme prior to Wechat, however the 
number of Alipay users are considerably less than the 
quantity of Wechat account holders, so the influence has its 
imminent limits. When Wechat introduced the personal 
wealth management scheme which was essentially the same 
as Yuebao, Alibaba’s fear was much greater than that of other 
competitors. Ma described this incident as being a “sneak 
attack on Pearl Harbour”. There are however, significant 
differences between Alibaba and Wechat's perception of the 
concept of money. In contrast to the value of money which 
Yuebao has, Wechat's ‘Red Envelop’ scheme is the grasping 
of human nature. (Xiaolong Zhang, inventor of the 'Red 
Envelop’ scheme). Regarding this scheme, Wechat 
pinpointed two vital facts derived from tradition and from 
elements of the current 'new' culture. Giving lucky money or 
‘red envelopes’ to family and friends is a long-fixed tradition 
during the Chinese Lunar New Year celebrations (more 
typically referred to as the Spring Festival). In addition, when 
Wechat introduced this red envelop scheme, they mixed 
tradition with fun and games, which played an integral part 
of Wechat's strategic plan. During the course of the Spring 
Festival, every Wechat member took part in numerous 
competitions for the red envelop in different chat groups to 
compete for the opportunity to ‘grab’ the money in the 
envelopes; the amounts within them ranged from just 0.01 
yuan to 100 yuan in each ‘grab’. This grab brought instant 
activity to the social networking groups and was the catalyst 
that resulted in this scheme spreading to the multitudes. It 
was a technological micro-channel through a social game 
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with a mixture of Chinese tradition blended in. 
Within 9 days since the beginning of the Spring Festival, 
there were more than 800 million Chinese people who 
received a total amount of 40 million red envelopes worth 
more than 400 million yuan. Unalike the desire for material 
wealth, which Alibaba pursued, Wechat provided human 
nature on their new financial product, which was inevitably 
received more favorably by their respective customers. 
Strategic Diversification of Alibaba and its eventual Drift 
6. From Bazaar Vendor to Street Bank 
Unalike to the intricately designed strategic evolutions, 
which are favoured by Western firms, financial evolution in 
Alibaba was rather an accidental by-product. One of the 
prominent dilemmas for firms providing e-commerce in 
China was the notion of rogue trading, a prevalent aspect of 
their culture that was based on an asymmetric information 
base. Reserving deposits for extended periods of time was 
integral in providing confidence to both parties, and Alibaba 
expanded on this ‘Trust Scheme,’ via the introduction of a 
special reserves initiative, with a reformed savings function.  
Since the introduction of Yuebao, internet finance and fund 
management are cash cows for Alibaba and its emerging 
competitors such as Tencent and Baidu, firms, which 
introduced their own internet finance service platforms, in 
close proximity to Yuebao. Although Alibaba pioneered the 
new framework for the notion of financial service for the 
netizens, there are essentially a high tide rather than an open 
ocean. To begin with, after the ‘Red envelop’ scheme at the 
Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) from Tencent, a Wechat-
led social-network mobile service provider, has gone from 
strength to strength and has proceeded to aggressively 
penetrate Alibaba’s financial fortress. For instance, 
Licaitong, which is operated by Tenpay, Tencent’s third-party 
payment affiliate, raked in $130 million in deposits on the 
first day on 30 January 2014, and the Financial Times 
reported that the figure had surpassed one billion yuan after 
its second day live. This data proved that Licaitong had 
surpassed the aggregated Yuebao’s 350 million yuan rate on 
the 13 June 2013. Baifa, another competitor derived from 
Baidu, which serves as the leading search engine in China, 
reaped one billion yuan on its first day of business. Although 
Yuebao has attracted 81 million account holders with 
aggregate investments totaling nearly 500 billion yuan (US 
$ 81 billion) as of the end of February 2014 (Xinhua, 21 
March 2014), it still remains as the market leader, regardless 
of the fact that there are more challenges from subsequent 
competitors. Surprisingly, the data released by ‘Tianhong 
Asset Management’, which officially runs Yuebao, shows 
that the product’s return rate declined considerably from 6% 
to 4.2% in recent times, which further undermined Yuebao’s 
attractiveness.  
In addition, as a security purpose, which is predominantly 
regarded as Yuebao’s weakest point, Licaitong provided a 
better secure service to the account holders. As Licaitong 
account holders, the account is bonded with a local bankcard, 
which means money can transfer between the Licaitong 
account and the bonded card. According to the Tencent 
announcement, Licaitong is extremely safe, due to the fact 
that the money in the account is not able to be transferred to 
other bankcards or be spent directly.  
In addition, in the case of Alipay and Yuebao, the money 
that one invests is transferred to Tianhong Asset Management 
Co. The fund has attracted 43 million customers and has 
reaped more than $30 billion in assets as of December 2013. 
However, the prominent concern of the investors; is the 
transparency of the nature of their funds, as one is unaware of 
the destination of their investments. On the contrary, Tencent 
teamed up with China’s Huaxia Bank Co and offers their 
product via their three year old WeChat messaging scheme, 
and the nature of their ultimate destination of their investments 
are shared with the individuals, which forms a collaborative 
transparent scheme between the investors and the respective 
firms, which their funds have benefited. This is a vital facet of 
Tencent, which makes it more appealing to customers than 
Alibaba, and thus, it is fundamental factor that Alibaba must 
address in order for it to overcome their competitors.  
Furthermore, multiple local banks, and mobile e-business 
suppliers are jumping on the bandwagon, and releasing their 
own wealth management schemes, and thus, a greater 
competitor is burgeoning. For instance, China Minsheng 
Banking Corp, a private national commercial bank, was 
inspired to set up a similar service, which goes by the name 
of Minsheng E-Business Co Ltd, and in this way a plethora 
of subsequent major firms have begun to take their respective 
shares of the market. A fight in the Yangtze has sprouted to a 
fracas in the Pacific Ocean. 
7. Strategic Drift and Diminishing Profit 
in the Global Term 
Due to the avid quantity of sellers that flocked to Alibaba 
owing to the leniency in the commissions, there were a 
plethora of merchants for the same products and thus, the 
depreciation of prices was the sole gateway by which one 
could reap the most customers. The notion of prices 
persistently decreased so greatly until a certain equilibrium 
was exceeded. The prices of goods eventually plummeted as 
a result of the copious amount of sellers, that the levels of 
profit abated, and thus, it was now not worth selling the 
product, due to the little to no profit that would be garnered. 
As a result, multiple vendors began to go astray from selling 
online and resorted to brick-and-mortar trading, as per the 
traditional method. Thus, as this has been an ongoing 
conundrum for Alibaba, it is adamant that they should seek to 
alleviate traders of this dilemma, should they wish to uphold 
their grand market-share of e-commerce.  
In comparison to the nomination as a ‘reliable’ third party 
platform from the Department of Commerce from the US in 
2000, Alibaba (including Taobao) was cemented as being a 
‘notorious market’ between 2008 to 2011 by the annual 
‘Special 301 Report’ and ‘Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Review’ 
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prepared by the Office of the US Trade Representative, 
owing to the high rate of claims for pirated or counterfeit 
goods, which Jack Ma has continuously strived to stop. 
Furthermore, as a whole, the increasing tax burden for SMEs 
in China, would eventually drive the majority of the small 
online vendors out of business, and would depreciate the 
customer rate by a significant margin.  
When operating system tends to experience more 
homogeneity through mobile applications, the business 
boundaries of e-commerce and e-marketing start to get 
bleaker. While Alibaba proceeds to hither and thither, 
Tencent, on the other hand, moves as per their prime strategic 
objective, which predominantly revolves around the 
development of their financial system. 
Table 1. Comparison on three big digital players. 
 Alibaba eBay Amazon 
Customer Base 1.4 billion 327 million 327 million 
Total sales (billion USD) $240  $16 $74.4 
Active User Base 300 million 145 million 244 million 
Employees 25,000 33,500 117,300 
Market Share (in China) 75% >1% 1% 
Total revenue (billion USD) $7.5 $16.05 $74.45 
Global market share 
Less than 
5% 
19% 
21% 
(prediction) 
Source: Derived from multiple sources of published data, 2014 
In order for Alibaba to become a global player, they need a 
distinct and innovative strategy to compete with subsequent 
high-flying conglomerates, in order for them to strive 
towards a specific goal, and to differentiate themselves from 
the pack. The table above clearly displays that aside from the 
Chinese market, Alibaba is still a regional player and 
currently serves as the ‘second level’ market penetrator, 
whereby they are perceived as many, as being a ‘first level’ 
player, but as various statistics display, Alibab was unable to 
fulfill the required expectations of subsequent global firms. 
During the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, Alibaba and Tencent 
introduced official betting sites, but Alibaba's service was 
unable to allow overseas users, who proved to contribute a 
vast amount to the overall profit reaped, to utilise this 
service. Thus, since the introduction of Yuebao, it is apparent 
that Alibaba has been one-step behind Tencent. 
8. Strategic Comparison Between 
Alibaba and Tencent 
The battle between the Ma’s rivalry has been transfigured 
into a legend. ‘Pony’ Ma and Jack Ma launched their 
respective businesses in close proximity of one another. It has 
been declared the most expensive competition in online 
history in China. However, it is still regional news from the 
perspective of the western world. QQ a product of Tencent, 
was started with a distinctive motive, revolutionising the 
social networking market, a feat which it eventually 
achieved; with over 1 billion registered members to this date. 
Alibaba, on the other hand, was initially a ‘directory,’ which 
served as a gateway between foreign buyers and local sellers. 
Its prominent purpose was to interlink buyers from multiple 
nations and sellers from within, however, the absence of a 
strategic objective led it to thrive in the wilderness for 
multiple years prior to the introduction of Taobao. 
Since January 2011, when Wechat (originally a photocopy 
of the Canadian born Kik Messenger) was introduced, 270 
million monthly active users synchronised to produce a 
popular smartphone messaging app that incorporates social 
networking, games and online payment schemes alongside 
personal wealth management monitors. As a mobile 
networking platform, WeChat has expanded above and 
beyond the personal social networking realm, through the 
opening of its platform to commercial and public services. 
According to Zhang Ying, the deputy product manager of 
WeChat, interviewed ‘more than 2 million banks, media 
outlets, companies, organisations and government based 
departments have registered public accounts on WeChat’. 
Boosted by these value-added functions, WeChat reached 
600 million registered users in total, with 100 million of 
these users based overseas, a feat which Alibaba was not able 
to achieve. Due to the lack of their social networking 
capabilities, which have proven to be a highly desirable facet 
for mobile internet users, Alibaba introduced Laiwang in 
September 2013. However, it failed to even touch the surface 
of the immense customer base which WeChat had reaped 
since their introduction. Another blow for the financial 
service in Alibaba's part was the CCTV survey, which 
exemplified the fact that 'the higher the average householder 
income a user has, the more likely he/she will be eligible to 
use the mobile function of Wechat’. (CCTV 21 March 2014) 
It was a fatal blow for Alibaba, who desired to be the market 
leader on the matter of wealth management in the Chinese 
financial e-business sector. In comparison to Alipay’s 2-2.5% 
commission charge, Licaitong from WeChat provides an 
attractive 0.6% commission charge to its trading clients. On 
11 March 2014, during the National People’s Congress, the 
Commission allowed Alibaba to focus primarily on small and 
micro clients in both its deposit and loan businesses. The 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) set a 
required limit on the maximum size of deposits and loans 
available per client. Meanwhile, Tencent will prioritise those 
with large deposits and will have a minimum threshold for 
each client with a deposit. Also, Tencent have a maximum 
loan size per client, similar to Alibaba. 
The strategic collaboration with JD.com (Jingdong Mall, 
an online e-commerce platform akin to Amazon) was a direct 
challenge to Alibaba’s dominant fortress of Taobao and 
Tmall. There were several technical problems however, 
which JD had, such as the manner in which they went about 
with the handling of the order capacity which had been 
capped to 100,000 per day, there was also no cloud service 
for their users, and alongside the mediocre logistic services, 
this significantly depreciated the quality of the service. 
However, WeChat’s substantial cash injection and the 
technological collaboration which they offered, swiftly 
enabled them to become the second biggest B2C operator.  
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It was confirmed by the Chinese government agency; 
China Internet Network Information Centre, who reported 
that more than 500 million internet users out of the 618 
million in China preferred to use mobile devices to access the 
internet rather than a PC or laptop, which are the main 
instruments that are utilised for Alibaba’s e-business 
platform. (BBC report 18 March 2014). 
Table 2. Buy-out process between Alibaba and Tencent since 2010. 
Alibaba Tencent 
Sino Weibo (China’s Twitter) – US$586 million for 18% stake  JD.Com (e-commerce platform) – US$ 214 million for 15% stake (March 2014) 
Shoprunner (retail website) – US$206 million investment Dianping (China’s Yelp) - US$ 400 million for 20% stake 
Kanbox (Cloud storage) – Acquired (undisclosed amount) 17u.cn (tour service) – US$ 82 million investment 
Quixey (China’s Google) – US$ 50 million investment Sogou (China’s Google) US$ 448 million for 36.5% stake 
AutoNavi (mapping service) – Acquired US$ 1.5 billion Linktech Navi (mapping service) – acquired for US$ 9.9 million 
Tianhong (financial management firm) US$ 193 million for 51% stake China South City Holdings (logistics) US$ 195 million for 10% stake 
1 stdibs (luxury e-commerce site) US$ 15 million investment 58.com US$ 736 million for 19.9% stake 
UCWeb (Mobile browser) Acquired (undisclosed amount)  
ChinaVision (TV/Movie studio) US$ 800 million for 60% stake  
Wasu Media Holding Co. US$ 1.05 billion for 20% stake  
ByeCity (travel provider) US$ 20 million investment  
Mogujie (Pinterest-type) – Acquired for US$ 200 million   
Guangzhou Evergrande Football Club – US$ 192 million for 60% stake  
Intime (HK based retail group) – US$ 692 million investment   
Source: Derived from multiple sources of published data, 2014 
The state of their rivals buy-out processes looks much 
more disciplined. Tencent is aggressively invading Alibaba’s 
e-business turf with deals that, unlike Ma’s are easily 
explainable and are comprehensible. Tencent has a distinct 
concentration for key strategic objectives, a stark contrast to 
Alibaba, who are instead splurging in adherence to a 
diversified strategy. It is evident that, not all of Ma’s frontier 
strategies have panned out in the long run, however some of 
them have the potential of bringing Alibaba down to earth. 
One of many focal points, is the fact that Alibaba obtained a 
loan of US$ 8 billion and utilised this cash injection to 
commence their buy-out scheme with several companies, 
although there was minimal evidence to strategically 
interlink the respective firms to Alibaba. In 2013, Alibaba 
spent US$ 6.4 billion for their respective M&A processes; 
unalike Alibaba, Tencent is a cash rich company, residing on 
a mound of cash that exceeds the value of US$ 5.5 billion 
and there are no foreign shareholders, a facet which Alibaba 
does not possess. Furthermore, Tencent has in recent times, 
been pushing into the overseas markets', especially the 
burgeoning South-East Asia and Latin America, with a 
campaign featuring Lionel Messi, the Argentinian and 
Barcelona FC's footballing icon, to enable their services to 
get across to the respective audience via a highly desired and 
loved figure; which further promotes the company's value. 
An act; which was also never replicated by their rivals. 
9. Conclusion 
As a global firm, strategic processes should be consistent 
and cogent in nature. It should provide an intricate strategic 
trajectory for both the shareholders and stakeholders. One of 
the prime concerns from the perception of a shareholder, 
during Alibaba’s initial tenure, was the fact that Mr. Ma’s 
personalised decision-making process was a continual risk 
for Alibaba. In 2011, when it spun off Alipay, Ma failed to 
inform Yahoo Inc. one of their prominent shareholders of the 
matter, which caused some, such as Mr Son from Softbank to 
be dubious of his leadership abilities. This was further 
demonstrated in recent buy-out processes such as the 
extravagant venture in Guangzhou Evergrande Football Club 
with a 1.2 billion yuan (US$ 192 million) investment, which 
was finalised over the period of a 15 minute meeting. Further 
cash injections such as that in the Hong Kong based Intime 
retail group clearly exemplified the imminent tradition which 
Chinese business men adhere to, in times of great prosperity. 
For instance, during the IT boom, Lenevo bought the PC 
section from IBM in 2004, which propelled it to the status of 
a global leader in the PC market. In 2008, however, the 
strategic failure of this acquisition was demonstrated by the 
plummeting of its share prices from 6 to 1.32 yuan in the 
Hong Kong Stock market. Alibaba’s continuous buy-out 
plans take the same route as the one that Lenovo undertook, 
when the sun was shining in their respective businesses.  
It was reported on 15 July 2014 that there were legal 
investigations taking place regarding dealings with Boyu 
Capital in relation to the political corruption issues in China 
and the pending result would be one of great importance and 
would be most sensitive for discussing the nature of Ma’s 
link to the political realm.  
At this moment in time, there are a plethora of possibilities 
for a ‘great firm,’ in China, to undertake, owing to the 
copious quantity of opportunities that cross their path. 
However, akin to the paths taken by Coca Cola, and Toyota, 
which were and still are core businesses’ in their respective 
nations, it is vital to strengthen one’s core strategy in times of 
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great affluence. Mr Ma’s perception of the ‘Too big to die’ 
concept, is not an idyllic strategic view of a firm of Alibaba’s 
calibre to undertake. When business began, Ma stuck to the 
‘Yang yu fang shui (wait till the water's full)’ strategy, 
however there is minimal time at one's disposal when 
developing your innovative strategy; for a firm that began as 
a crocodile in the Yangtze River and burgeoned into a global 
shark in the Pacific Ocean.  
Hence, it is rational to perceive that due to the 
advancement in the calibre of their firm, Alibaba have 
significantly diversified into multiple markets, some of which 
are wholly esoteric; and have thus impeded their strategic 
advancement process by going astray from their initial 
innovation flare which differentiated them from subsequent 
firms. One can further acknowledge that Alibaba has lost 
their 'strategic momentum', and have gone above and beyond 
the frame of Eco-business due to their exotic acquisitions. 
As per common belief, ‘why change a winning formula?’ 
it is adamant that a ‘winning firm,’ in its respective market 
adheres to their initial purpose and strategic objective. 
Otherwise, it will soon result in a firm with no distinct 
initiative, ebbing and flowing down a stream of uncertainty. 
During his recent IPO roadshow, Ma emphasised the fact that 
Alibaba harbours big growth ambitions in the US, Europe 
and has further desires to move into Russia and Brazil. 
However, it is evident that regardless of these transnational 
motives, 93% of their total revenue still originates from 
China, illustrating the fact that although Alibaba will triumph 
over Amazon in the domestic market, Amazon will continue 
to prevail globally. Thus, in order to strive for market 
dominance, it is vital that Alibaba prioritises the global stage, 
and averts from its drifted diversification strategy, which was 
regarded as a 'self-inflicted wound.' They should further 
diverge from the Sino-Business centred structure and seek to 
diversify their focus, in order to hinder the wrecked vision 
that Ma dreamt at the first stage of the firm's growth, from 
becoming an imminent reality.  
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